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Abstract 5 
The world of work continues to change. Labour markets in most countries are increasingly 6 
shaped by policies of neoliberal deregulation while strategies of flexibility dominate public 7 
policy and corporate strategy across an array of sectors. At the forefront of these changes are 8 
the myriad labour market intermediaries that are used by workers and employees to enhance 9 
their ability to navigate ever more complex and volatile labour markets. For some, mediated 10 
employment, recruitment and work practices mean greater career progression and profit 11 
making ability, but for many others it means increased precarity, vulnerability and insecurity. 12 
This paper critically reviews existing literature within geography on three types of private 13 
labour market intermediary, namely; temporary staffing agencies and contract brokers; 14 
executive search firms and headhunters and; informal intermediaries such as gangmasters. 15 
The final section addresses the future for research in labour geography and, in particular, 16 
suggests new ways in which to broaden our understanding of labour market intermediaries 17 
and their impact on worker agency.  18 
 19 
Introduction 20 
Since the 1970s labour market deregulation and flexible employment practices have led to a 21 
“frenzy of academic and populist speculation about the future of work” (Wills 2009, 442). 22 
Recently described by the Labour Party leader as “nasty, brutish and short-term” (Wintour & 23 
Topping 2012) the contemporary UK labour market, and indeed that of many other countries, 24 
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is  fundamentally characterised by the increasingly individualised nature of work and the 25 
growing ‘contractualization’ of employment (Standing, cited in Allen & Henry 1997, 180). 26 
For workers at the lower-end of the labour market this means increased risk and insecurity 27 
(Allen & Henry 1997) whereas, for the “desirably qualified” it can mean enhanced career 28 
development (Wills 2009, 443). Nonetheless, for employees of all types their future success 29 
and security increasingly depends on their ability to navigate ever more complex and volatile 30 
labour markets (Benner 2002). As such, employers and employees across an assortment of 31 
sectors and skill sets are using labour market intermediaries (LMIs) to help them do just that. 32 
Yet, Benner (2002, 86) points out that ‘few studies of labor [sic] markets even recognise the 33 
importance of intermediaries’. This is beginning to change as a growing body of literature 34 
reconsiders the significance of LMIs, and their explosive growth, on workers, employers and 35 
labour markets. This paper reviews the existing geographical literature across three groups of 36 
LMIs; temporary staffing agencies (TSAs) and contract brokers; executive search firms and 37 
headhunters; and the emerging research agenda in the less well developed area of informal 38 
intermediaries and gangmasters. The paper then suggests how future research can take 39 
forward our understanding of LMIs and their impact on labour agency.  40 
Labour market intermediaries comprise a broad range of organisations that help match people 41 
looking for work with employers. The existence of these organisations is not a new 42 
phenomenon; public sector employment services, union hiring halls, and temporary 43 
placement agencies for example, have been around for a long time (Benner et al. 2007). 44 
However, the number, variety and impact of LMIs has increased significantly since the 45 
1980s. As such, researchers and policymakers have focused their attention on certain types of 46 
intermediaries such as temporary staffing agencies and headhunters. But, others remain less 47 
well studied, for example, gangmasters and internet-based job boards. Chris Benner provides 48 
one of the few in-depth explorations, from a geographical perspective, of multiple LMIs. In 49 
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Work in the New Economy (2002) and Staircases or Treadmills? (2007) Benner and 50 
colleagues examine the role of different LMIs among groups of workers in the knowledge 51 
economy of Silicon Valley and in aiding low-wage workers in Milwaukee. 52 
Traditionally the definition of a LMIs referred to the brokering or matching of activities in 53 
which employers and job seekers use a third party to help find a ‘best match’ (National 54 
Commission of Manpower Policy 1978 in Benner 2002). However, Benner (2002, 2003) 55 
suggests that a more comprehensive definition should consider four fundamental functions 56 
that LMIs perform within the labour market. These include: reducing transaction costs, 57 
shaping compensation levels, risk displacement (particularly onto workers) and network 58 
building. By considering these four actions Benner takes into account the traditional 59 
transaction cost approach but is also able to consider the wider non-market social 60 
relationships that shape the economic transactions between intermediaries and 61 
workers/employers, and which are not driven solely by pricing and efficiency. The legal 62 
definition of LMIs is also a point of contention especially in relation to regulation and the 63 
repercussions for workers (Gonos 1997). Indeed, labour advocates in both the US and UK 64 
have argued that a clearer legal status is needed for different types of profit-making LMIs in 65 
order to “effectuate a fair regime of regulation for these formidable players in the labour 66 
relations arena” (Freedland 2003; Freeman & Gonos 2005, 295).  67 
The experiences of workers at all levels of the labour market can depend on the 68 
organisational structure and remit of the intermediaries they interact with. Benner (2002) 69 
identifies three broad types of LMI; private sector, membership-based and public sector. 70 
There are numerous organisations within each group; this paper focuses on three different 71 
types of private for-profit LMIs (TSAs, headhunters and gangmasters) and considers their 72 
recent explosive growth and active role in shaping labour markets, changing employment 73 
relations and creating markets. Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010, 226) argue that “profit-making 74 
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intermediaries represent a unique fraction of capital... that provides an increasingly important 75 
range of labour market services”. Within low-end temporary and highly skilled elite labour 76 
markets academics have argued that private, profit-seeking LMIs are driving market 77 
development and changing employment norms (Peck & Theodore 2002; Faulconbridge et al. 78 
2008). Whereas, public and membership-based intermediaries are more likely to emerge as a 79 
response to rapidly changing and volatile employment conditions (Benner 2002). Public 80 
sector and membership-based intermediaries such as training/education institutions, 81 
professional guilds, trade associations and unions primarily aim to improve the labour market 82 
outcomes for workers. While, private sector LMIs generate profit by selling their services to 83 
employers. Indeed, Peck and Theodore (1998, 660) note that “profit is derived from giving 84 
employers ‘what they want’” and “a premium is placed on meeting client expectations”, in 85 
many cases this means passing risks onto workers (Allen & Henry 1997).  86 
Labour market intermediaries and flexibility 87 
The burgeoning use of LMIs by firms and workers should be understood within the wider 88 
context of neoliberal labour market deregulation and the insurgence of flexibility within 89 
labour market policy and corporate strategy. Flexibility remains a contested and value laden 90 
concept, holding different meanings depending on those analysing it (see, for example, Buzar 91 
2008). Peck (1996, 150) argues that “[t]o bundle all forms of contemporary labor [sic] market 92 
restructuring together under the generic and increasingly elastic term ‘flexibility’ is 93 
manifestly inadequate”. Indeed, there is insufficient room in this paper to unpack such a laden 94 
term. Nonetheless, we can learn a lot about the rapidly increasing use of private sector LMIs 95 
by exploring how others have analysed their role in relation to increasingly flexible labour 96 
markets.  97 
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Many have critically examined the massive changes in employment and labour markets since 98 
the mid 1970s (Osterman 1999; Kalleberg 2001, 2009). This ‘neoliberal revolution’ has been 99 
characterised by a period of intensified economic integration and global competition, the 100 
outsourcing of manufacturing and the concomitant emphasis on knowledge-intensive work 101 
(Kalleberg 2009). Furthermore, there has been an ideological shift in our view of work away 102 
from the secure, unionised, life-long career common during the post-war era towards 103 
contractualised, individualised and often insecure employment. Increased global competition 104 
has enhanced the need for firms to react quickly to market fluctuations while externalising the 105 
costs of market downturns. This has led to a systemic enforcement within public policy and 106 
corporate strategy of flexibility initiatives designed to enhance the functioning of 107 
‘frictionless’ markets and corporate competition (Crouch 2010). The growth of LMIs has 108 
been a response to this fever of flexibility as well as a compounding force for it. Indeed, 109 
Benner (2002, 6) states that; 110 
Flexibility in regional labor [sic] markets contributes to the growth of intermediaries, which in 111 
turn help facilitate labor market flexibility – in essence labor market intermediaries are a 112 
fundamental feature of labor markets in the information economy.  113 
Firms may introduce flexibility into their corporate strategies in three ways; through attempts 114 
to individualise employment relations and wage bargaining by weakening trade unions; by 115 
multi-skilling workers within the firm and redeploying them throughout the workplace 116 
(internal or functional flexibility) or; through the use of part-time or temporary workers to 117 
facilitate rapid quantitative adjustments in labour (external or numerical flexibility) (Atkinson 118 
1984; Atkinson & Meager 1986; Dale & Bamford 1988; Storper & Scott 1990; Peck 1996). 119 
Certain LMIs such as TSAs and contract brokers facilitate flexible staffing arrangements and 120 
are increasingly used by firms to externalise employment and achieve greater numerical 121 
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flexibility (see Kalleberg & Marsden 2005). Other LMIs such as employment agencies and 122 
headhunters are expanding their remit of activity to facilitate labour market flexibility for 123 
both firms and workers and further aid in the navigation of complex and unpredictable labour 124 
markets, as such; intermediary institutions are reshaping the dynamics of flexible labour 125 
markets (Benner 2002).  126 
It has been argued that TSAs play a strategically important role in delivering labour market 127 
flexibility by acting as purveyors of flexibility and offering a range of ‘flexibility packages’ 128 
across a growing number of sectors and countries (Peck & Theodore 2002; Ward 2005; Coe 129 
et al. 2010). By quickly sourcing large numbers of contingent workers and providing less 130 
restrictive employment contracts TSAs provide a new institutional medium through which 131 
firms can transfer the shocks of fluctuating product demand and off-load the risks of 132 
economic uncertainty onto workers who ultimately “bear the greatest burdens of this ‘new 133 
flexibility’” (Peck & Theodore 1998, 661, see also Allen & Henry 1997; Van Breugel et al. 134 
2005).  135 
Temporary staffing agencies and contract brokers 136 
Temporary staffing agencies (also defined as temporary help firms/temporary work agencies) 137 
and contract brokers facilitate the outsourcing of jobs to contingent workers on open-ended 138 
contracts with limited fringe benefits (Purcell et al. 2004). Although the name suggests short-139 
term placements, many ‘temps’ or ‘contractors’ are often employed on long-term or rolling 140 
contracts referred to as ‘perma-temps’ (Peck & Theodore 2007; Smith & Neuwirth 2008; Coe 141 
et al. 2010) or used by firms to screen potential permanent employees with no obligation 142 
through ‘temp-to-perm’ agreements (Ward et al. 2001; Theodore & Peck 2002; Benner et al. 143 
2003). Research has shown that routine, peripheral work (e.g. call centre workers or 144 
production/warehouse operatives) and outside expert jobs, especially those where skills are 145 
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required only periodically (e.g. web developers), lend themselves particularly well to 146 
outsourcing via this type of intermediary (Purcell et al. 2004).  147 
Employers utilise these arrangements as a strategic alternative to direct employment during 148 
fluctuations in demand, to cover short term absenteeism, when (non-firm-specific) expert 149 
skills are required, for seasonal agricultural work or unsociable shifts patterns (Peck & 150 
Theodore 1998; Purcell et al. 2004; McDowell et al. 2009). These intermediaries charge 151 
client firms a fee based on the hourly wage of each temp. Although hourly rates are not 152 
necessarily cheaper via these LMIs, clients often make cost savings through benefit 153 
reductions, lower exit costs and minimal screening and training (Purcell et al. 2004). TSAs 154 
and contract brokers can be characterised by the triangular relationship between the LMI, the 155 
temporary employee and the client firm (Forde 2001; Druker & Stanworth 2004; UNITE 156 
2007). This relationship creates distinctive dynamics vis-à-vis direct employment or 157 
recruitment via permanent employment agencies regarding, for example; mechanisms of 158 
‘dual control’ over temps (Gottfried 1991, 1992), the commitment of contingent workers 159 
towards host organisations (Van Breugel et al. 2005) and the deepening functional integration 160 
between intermediary organisations and clients – which allow the intermediary principal 161 
control over recruitment functions and/or an on-site presence at the client company (Forde 162 
2001; Ward 2003, 2004) – this can blur the boundaries of the firm and distinctions between 163 
internal and external labour markets (Peck & Theodore 1998). 164 
Different temporary workers are serviced by different types of intermediary (Purcell et al. 165 
2004). Many have argued that the temporary market is polarised between TSAs which supply 166 
low-skilled ‘temps’ and contract brokers that supply specialist contact workers (Peck & 167 
Theodore 1998, 2001; McDowell et al. 2008). In most cases specialist agencies emphasise a 168 
value added approach, quality of service and customised supply in the interests of the client 169 
company and employees (Purcell et al. 2004). Benner (2002) notes that contract brokerage 170 
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firms allow specialised consultants to market themselves (through the intermediary) to a 171 
higher number of clients and provide an important service in the knowledge economy. 172 
Moreover, skilled technicians and IT professionals placed by contract brokers often act as 173 
self-employed or independent contractors affording them greater autonomy than lower-skilled 174 
‘temps’ (Benner 2002; Purcell et al. 2004). Consequently, highly skilled workers, working on 175 
a temporary basis, often benefit from using contract brokers and may prefer this to permanent 176 
work (Benner 2002).  177 
On the other hand, TSAs pursue a low-margin high-volume business strategy targeting clients 178 
with large pools of contingent labour, emphasis is placed on cost, speed and “hassle 179 
reduction” (Peck & Theodore 1998, 665; Peck et al. 2005). The characteristically thin 180 
margins of the temporary staffing industry (TSI) have led to aggressive strategies of 181 
diversification (upwards) and internationalisation (outwards) (Ward 2004; Peck et al. 2005; 182 
Coe et al. 2007). McDowell et al. (2009) argue that low-skilled workers employed via TSAs 183 
are some of the most vulnerable with many of the risks offset by firms passed onto workers 184 
(Allen & Henry 1997; Peck & Theodore 1998). Furthermore, the emphasis on price and the 185 
inherent threat of competition within the TSI forces agencies to priorities client relationships, 186 
leaving them little room to refute discriminatory hiring practices and other unscrupulous 187 
client demands at the risk of clients changing suppliers (Peck & Theodore 1998). The costs of 188 
this instability are borne by the lower end of the workforce where TSAs can institutionalise 189 
inequality and reify tendencies of segmentation creating hierarchies of inequality and new 190 
types of workforce stratification amongst the most vulnerable workers (Peck & Theodore 191 
1998; McDowell et al. 2009).  192 
The TSI represents itself as a passive market-enhancing service provider representing and 193 
reconciling the needs of supply (labours desire for non-standard work scheduling enhancing 194 
work/life balance) and demand (employers additional labour requirements) (Peck & 195 
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Theodore 2002). However, Peck and Theodore (2002, 147) argue that the TSI is in fact an 196 
“active intermediary in the job market”. They state that TSAs make their markets by 197 
providing new employment solutions and enhanced flexibility to firms. This has led to a host 198 
of insecure and precarious characteristics now associated with many national labour markets, 199 
such as; two tier compensation systems in manufacturing, the normalisation of pre-screening 200 
in clerical and administration work, deunionisation, the erosion of employer-sponsored 201 
benefits, the displacement of risk onto workers, lean workforce systems, the casualisation of 202 
public sector jobs and the restructuring of incentive systems (Peck & Theodore 2002). Far 203 
from the passive intermediary the industry would have us believe TSAs have had a huge 204 
impact on our labour markets. 205 
The continued geographical and sectoral spread of the TSI has led to a rapidly developing 206 
body of research in economic geography. In 2010 Coe et al provided an insightful review of 207 
the temporary staffing literature in this journal. They identify three approaches to research on 208 
temporary staffing; the client firm perspective (why firms use temporary agency workers), 209 
the worker perspective (the consequences of working via a TSA) and, the agency perspective 210 
in which they place the third actor centre stage and suggest four areas of future research.  211 
First, Coe et al. (2010) assert that future research should consider how TSAs ‘make a 212 
difference’ and actually construct markets by; reshaping employment norms through 213 
enhanced flexibility; the expansion into new sectors and countries and; by engaging in the 214 
political sphere as independent labour market commentators. Second, they urge future 215 
researchers to consider the fine grained ways in which wider labour market regimes including 216 
regulation, corporate organisations and welfare provisions (amongst others) shape nationally 217 
distinctive temporary staffing markets. Indeed some have argued that a city-by-city analysis 218 
of regionally distinctive temporary staffing markets is also important (Peck & Theodore 219 
2002; Ward 2005). Third, as the market for temporary staffing expands geographically Coe et 220 
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al. (2010) call for research which explores why, how, where and with what effects the 221 
temporary staffing industry is globalising. Finally, they argue that although current research 222 
has addressed the role of TSAs in facilitating migrant employment once people have arrived 223 
in the country future research needs to consider the role played by TSAs in the mediation of 224 
migration.  225 
Executive search firms and headhunters 226 
Outside of temporary work, executive search agencies and headhunters play a pivotal role in 227 
the supply of specialised highly-skilled workers for permanent positions. Although the 228 
function of TSAs within low-end labour markets has encouraged critical debate, “at the 229 
opposite end of the labour market, there remains an absence of scholarship” (Faulconbridge 230 
et al. 2008, 211). However, within economic geography Beaverstock, Faulconbridge and Hall 231 
have begun to address this “troubling void” and examine the strategies and influence of 232 
executive search agencies in elite labour markets (ibid). In contrast to TSAs and contract 233 
brokers these LMIs are used to find highly-skilled permanent workers for the core workforce 234 
or those at the pinnacle of organisational hierarchies (Faulconbridge et al. 2009). In the 235 
highest echelons of these secretive intermediaries executive search firms charge a fee in 236 
advance of any placement and many refuse jobs with a starting salary below £100,000 (Jenn 237 
2005).  238 
These intermediaries have been particularly important in the “war for talent” (see Michaels et 239 
al. cited in Faulconbridge et al. 2009, 800) as emphasis is placed on the need to recruit 240 
talented executives that can drive innovation and increase profitability in the knowledge 241 
economy. This process is intensified by the growth of “mobile talent” as experts are 242 
“poached” from rival firms in order to avoid missing-out on new ideas and star candidates 243 
from outside the internal labour market (Faulconbridge et al. 2008, 214-217). As such, 244 
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headhunters and executive search firms provide highly specialised, value added networks 245 
which tap into geographically dispersed elite labour markets and find talented candidates. 246 
Vinodrai (2006) argues that in niche industries these intermediaries may be less effective. For 247 
example, in Toronto’s design industry the fuzzy boundaries of the occupation cause 248 
confusion among some larger headhunting firms that do not understand the industry, 249 
rendering them of little use to designers. Yet, headhunters and executive search firms are now 250 
present in many professional industries with specialist boutique consultancies in niche sectors 251 
or large agencies with specialist divisions (Jenn 2005).  252 
As is the case with TSAs, Headhunters and executive search firms play an active role in 253 
shaping employment relations, changing recruitment practices and creating markets. 254 
Faulconbridge et al. (2008) argue that headhunters reproduce demand for their services 255 
through internationalisation of the industry which allows them to promote market-making 256 
rhetoric, navigate best practice guideline restrictions and promulgate the legitimacy of 257 
headhunting above direct recruitment. The tactics used in the geographical spread of the elite 258 
search industry depend on and reproduce rhetoric associated with the knowledge economy. 259 
Headhunters ensure that corporations entrust the search for their highest executives to elite 260 
search agencies in the belief that there is little alternative and without these intermediaries 261 
they risk inefficient recruitment, losing out on the best candidates and ultimately compromise 262 
their competitiveness. As such, Faulconbridge et al. (2008) argue that headhunters have 263 
cultivated the awareness of and desire for headhunting across different geographical markets.  264 
Further to this, Faulconbridge et al. (2009, 801) argue that executive search firms play a 265 
significant role in defining the nature of ‘talent’ thus “determining who does and does not 266 
classify as a talented individual”. They refer to this at a “new boys network” in which skilled 267 
workers are required to meet key markers of cultural capital and ‘talent’ determined by 268 
headhunters. This creates a “geographically inscribed hierarchy and exclusiveness” and  269 
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means that certain candidates dominate at the expense of those that do not fit the markers set 270 
by headhunters (Faulconbridge et al. 2009, 807). As such, the proliferation of executive 271 
search firms within elite labour markets means certain skilled workers may be marginalised 272 
and disadvantaged along lines determined by LMIs.  273 
Beaverstock et al. (2010) and Hall et al. (2009) also examine the ways in which elite search 274 
agencies embed themselves in labour markets. They analyse the expansion and 275 
internationalisation strategies of executive search firms and consider the ‘softer’ processes of 276 
‘professionalization’ and ‘legitimization’. They argue that these softer processes such as 277 
reputation building and creating a culture of acceptance require greater attention when 278 
considering the strategies of unbounded professions. Earlier work by Clark (1993) suggests 279 
that minimal barriers to entry create distinctive characteristics within the executive 280 
recruitment industry and as a result there is a mix of high and low quality consultants in the 281 
UK. Therefore, trust producing mechanisms such as contingent fees, reputation (corporate 282 
and individual) and regulation (contractual agreements) of the executive recruitment industry 283 
are important in mitigating decline in service quality and possible market collapse.  284 
There are similarities between intermediaries that specialise in permanent and temporary 285 
recruitment not least the focus on profit-driven employer centric services, minimal barriers to 286 
entry and the off-setting of risk onto workers. Furthermore, their growing diversification and 287 
internationalisation into numerous countries and sectors of the labour market leave most with 288 
little choice but to utilise their services in some form. However, intermediary organisations 289 
and their actions do not always exist within formal or regulated spheres. The following 290 
section provides an overview of the approaches and emerging research amongst informal 291 
intermediaries, specifically the practices of gangmasters in the UK. 292 
Informal intermediaries 293 
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Perhaps the most well-known account of informal for-profit LMIs in the UK is associated 294 
with the drowning of 23 cockle pickers in Morecombe Bay in 2004 that were recruited and 295 
organised via a gangmaster. The gangmaster was convicted for their manslaughter while the 296 
owners of the company that traded the cockles faced no charges as the ‘indirect’ employers of 297 
the cocklers – a bleak yet lucid illustration of the offset risks afforded to employers by some 298 
LMIs. A recent report by Oxfam states that “workers employed through gangmasters are 299 
some of the most vulnerable and exploited in the UK” (Oxfam 2009, 1). Yet, this group of 300 
workers and the associated gangmasters have received little attention in labour geography and 301 
could be considered as one of the “often-neglected groups” within the discipline (Lier 2007, 302 
829). This is surprising considering the UK’s resurgent use of gangmasters since 1980s - far 303 
from a historic relic of the feudal system nor confined to the gruelling work regimes of less 304 
developed countries – gangmasters are a fundamental feature of capitalist agriculture and 305 
have become a common and necessary intermediary for many unskilled workers and 306 
employers within agribusiness enterprises (Brass 2004). The work by Strauss (2012b, 2) has 307 
begun to address this as she considers the resurgence and social reproduction of gang labour 308 
in the UK in relation to “neoliberal imperatives to create flexible labour markets”. 309 
The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) was established in 2004 to officially license 310 
labour providers in agriculture, horticulture, food processing, shellfish gathering and forestry 311 
sections thus protecting workers and employers by ensuring that gangmasters operated within 312 
the law.  However, its success in reducing the exploitative nature of gang labour especially 313 
within supermarket supply-chain agriculture is questionable (see Strauss 2009, 2012b). 314 
Moreover, Oxfam reports that abuses by unlicensed, informal gangmasters still exist in 315 
sectors beyond its remit (for example in construction, hospitality and care) and against 316 
workers fearful of whistle blowing. Indeed, the fuzzy boundaries and limited regulation 317 
concerning the activities of informal gangmasters requires greater theoretical and empirical 318 
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exploration. Furthermore, Strauss (2012b) promotes further research on the scalar 319 
complexities of gang labour which take into account the regional and national institutions and 320 
regulation that mediate the processes of work.  321 
There are strong ties between gangmasters and the use of migrant workers (see Kuptsch 322 
2006). Evidence presented by Oxfam suggests that individual and organised networks of 323 
gangmasters encourage workers to move to the UK by facilitating travel, accommodation and 324 
employment. These practices are often associated with illegal and exploitative practices such 325 
as forced or coerced labour, smuggling and trafficking (Schmidt 2006; Oxfam 2009). This 326 
has been compounded by EU accession and the influx of Eastern European workers, both 327 
independently and via gangmasters. During this time in 2004 reports of abuse by 328 
intermediary organisations increased markedly (Oxfam 2009). Indeed, McDowell et al. 329 
(2009) argue that economic migrants are often forced to accept the most precarious jobs 330 
while limited regulation in the UK labour market (compared with the rest of Europe) has led 331 
to competition among the migrant workforce for casual positions at the ‘bottom-end’ of the 332 
labour market. Moreover, Andrees (2006) reports that the vast majority of migrant workers 333 
that use intermediaries are using informal employment agencies and gangmasters1 and are 334 
more likely to experience coercion and forced labour as a result. 335 
The practices of gangmasters and their role in the exploitation of migrant workers have been 336 
portrayed in films such as It’s a Free World (2007) by Ken Loach and Ghosts (2006) by Nick 337 
Broomfield. However, the practices of these agents and their role in the movement of workers 338 
over national borders is one of the most under researched topics in migration research 339 
(Kuptsch 2006). Further research within economic geography on the role of gangmasters in 340 
the UK might also draw on discussions and evidence from the temporary staffing literature as 341 
well as the inevitable links with existing work on coerced and forced labour (see Strauss 342 
2012a).  343 
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Conclusion: LMIs and labour geography  344 
This paper has critically reviewed the literature on three broad types of LMI and provides one 345 
of the few attempts to discuss the impacts of multiple LMIs in one place. As a means of 346 
drawing these approaches together, here I suggest directions for future with labour 347 
geography.  348 
The sub-discipline of labour geography is dedicated to understanding labour as an active 349 
maker of social space and has developed a diverse body of research with “an explicit focus 350 
on the spatiality of particular worker struggles” (Lier 2007, 821 see also Castree et al. 2004; 351 
Castree 2007; Rogaly 2009). As labour geography continues to develop and extend its areas 352 
of analysis, the agency of labour has come under increasing scrutiny. In an attempt to move 353 
beyond the rather abstract discussions of labour agency Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010) 354 
encourage a re-embedded understanding of labour agency through further study of four social 355 
arenas that are fundamental to labour and its political organisation, these are: capital, the 356 
state, the community and labour market intermediaries. They offer an analytical path for 357 
labour geography which requires future research to reconnect the agency of labour with the 358 
economic and societal systems that surround workers. Hence, taking account of the existing 359 
research as well as Coe and Jordhus-Lier’s proposition I suggest the following research 360 
agenda to help understand what role geography may play in the relationship between LMIs 361 
and the agency of labour. 362 
First, future research on LMIs should consider how these organisations are changing the 363 
spatial dynamics of labour agency. LMIs have created a distance between the employee and 364 
the employer both spatially – as workers move between multiple workplaces – and 365 
emotionally – as workers have little industrial relations contact with their “real employer” 366 
(Wills 2009, 444). This creates structural disempowerment for workers because the mutual 367 
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dependency between worker and employer is severed by the intermediary thus making 368 
collective bargaining impractical (Wills 2009). Wills argues that workers need to navigate the 369 
intermediary and find new ways of bargaining with their real employer. She presents 370 
examples of alliance-building between workers and groups at different geographical scales 371 
which have allowed workers to target their real employers and improve working conditions 372 
and wages. Future research should therefore give greater consideration to how LMIs disrupt 373 
conventional employment relationships and in turn affect the spatiality of labour agency i.e. 374 
where and towards which actors agency is directed.  375 
Furthermore, Lier (2007, 826) notes the tendency for research in labour geography to 376 
“overlook worker agency that is not articulated as collectively organised”. However, LMIs 377 
provide workers greater opportunity to express individual agency and improve their 378 
experience of work. For example, the use of contract brokers by skilled workers improves 379 
their ability to approach multiple employers thus increasing employment choice and allowing 380 
for greater individual worker agency. While, limited contractual restrictions on temporary 381 
contracts allow temps to move between different TSAs in order to gain better hourly rates – 382 
although still disadvantaged by the precarious nature of agency work – this demonstrates how 383 
LMIs allow workers to move quickly to ‘better’ jobs thus demonstrating individual worker 384 
agency. Moreover, James and Vira (2012) document the strategic use of a diverse range of 385 
LMIs by call centre workers in India used to circumvent limited internal job ladders and 386 
move to better paid more favourable jobs in other companies, another example of individual 387 
worker agency facilitated by LMIs.  388 
Hence, future research on LMIs should consider their influence on worker mobility and the 389 
effect this has on worker agency. Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010, 218) identify that “strategies 390 
for matching capital’s (potential) mobility” are an essential aspect of the agency of labour. 391 
This paper has shown that informal LMIs present a particularly important group in this 392 
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respect, as such, it is therefore important that future research also accounts for the role of 393 
formal and informal LMIs in mediating the movement of workers and reshaping worker 394 
agency amongst migrant and other mobile workers. In the facilitation of migration LMIs are 395 
actively reshaping the spatialities of worker mobility thus having a dramatic effect both in 396 
constraining and enhancing worker agency.  397 
Finally, there has been a tendency for research on LMIs to focus on North America and 398 
Western Europe. Research on TSAs has made the biggest contribution in moving beyond 399 
these industry heartlands to consider ‘temping’ in Eastern Europe (Coe et al. 2008), Australia 400 
(Coe et al. 2009a), Sweden (Coe et al. 2009b) and Canada (Vosko 2000). Yet, there has been 401 
little work which considers the role of TSAs within the global South. James and Vira (2012) 402 
and Endresen (2010) provide noteworthy exceptions to this regarding the role of LMIs in the 403 
career progression of call centre workers in India and labour hire agencies in Namibia, 404 
respectively. Nonetheless, the study of other LMIs would benefit from further work on their 405 
impact beyond the US and Western Europe. Furthermore, future research may benefit for 406 
studies which consider the links between a broader range of LMIs. For example, the use of 407 
interned-base job-boards which have become a “standard component in many job search 408 
strategies” (Benner 2002, 117) yet, have received little attention for their impact on workers 409 
experiences and labour market functioning. 410 
                                                          
1 The ILO Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour was carried out in 2003. It surveyed 644 return 
migrant workers from Albania, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine.  
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